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Overview Chapter 2: 
Parity distribution and completed family size in Europe:  





By  the  end  of  the  20
th  century  the  two-child  family  became  the  norm  throughout 
Europe. Between 40 and over 50 percent of women in the 1950s and 1960s cohorts had 
two children. There were some incipient signs that shares of two-child families were 
declining,  especially  in  Central  and  Eastern  and  Southern  Europe.  An  increase  in 
childlessness among recent generations was an almost universal trend. The increase in 
proportions of one-child families was prominent in CEE and in SE. Wherever shares of 
childless women and of women with one child continue to grow, the obvious result will 
be entrenched below replacement fertility. Much depends on progression ratios to first 
and  to  second  births.  In  CEE  mainly  the  progression  ratios  to  second  births  are 
declining. In the Nordic countries progression ratios to first and to second births were 
relatively  stable  and  even  more  so  in  France.  Altogether,  most  people  opt  for  two 
children, very few for three or more, the frequency of the one-child family is increasing 
as  are  the  proportions  of  people  remaining  childless.  The  latter  trends  were  more 
pronounced in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe and not so much in Northern and 
Western countries. 
 
                                                            
1 In this chapter the terms “parity” and “family size” will be used interchangeably. This is not an accurate use 
of the term “family size,” but it has become customary in this context and means the number of children 
borne by women irrespective of partnership status. 
2 E-mail: Tfrejka@aol.com Frejka: Overview Chapter 2: Parity distribution and completed family size in Europe  
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1. Introduction  
From the middle of the 19
th through the second half of the 20
th century, the prevailing 
“large family” model of three or more children was gradually replaced by the two-child 
family. A diverse set of social, economic, political and cultural developments generated 
this process. Improved standards of living, advances in public sanitation, and increasing 
attention  to  personal  hygiene  were  among  the  important  conditions  of  declining 
mortality, particularly due to a drop in infant mortality, which was one reason for the 
decline in childbearing. Rising costs and declining benefits of children and childrearing 
were additional reasons for parents of successive generations to have smaller numbers 
of  children.  Gender  relationships  were  changing  in  society  and  in  the  family,  with 
increasing  proportions  of  women  employed.  At  the  same  time,  people’s  economic 
aspirations  and  expectations,  as  well  as  their  growing  individualism,  materialism, 
secularism and desire for personal self-fulfillment, were undermining the satisfaction 
derived from having children. These were among the principal conditions leading to 
small family size. 
This  chapter  will  explore  in  some  detail  the  demographic  developments  that 
generated  the  two-child  family  model  which  prevailed  throughout  the  developed 
countries by the end of the 20
th century (see, for instance, van de Kaa 2001:316-318). A 
crucial contemporary issue is whether the two-child family norm will last, or whether it 
will be replaced by societies in which large proportions of parents will decide to have 
only one child, or no children at all. 
The  focus  will  be  on  actual  completed  family  size  distributions  and  trends. 
Analyses of desired or ideal family size are not included because these have been dealt 
with quite extensively in recent literature (for instance, Goldstein et al. 2003; Fokkema 
and Esveldt 2005; Testa 2006) 
 
 
2. The data  
The analysis of parity distribution in this chapter is conducted with cohort data. Such an 
approach  has  the  advantage  of  reflecting  quite  adequately  lifetime  developments 
experienced  by  families  and  by  women.  At  the  same  time,  it  should  be  taken  into 
account that statistical information about the contemporary status is outdated. A reliable 
picture is based on data of cohorts that have completed their childbearing. These data 
provide an adequate tool for analyzing trends, but the end point provides information 
about generations that were in their prime childbearing years one, two, or even three 
decades ago.   Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 4 
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Data used in the overview analysis are from the country chapters complemented by 
those  of  the  Observatoire  Démographique  Européen. The  pathways  of  constructing 
parity distributions depend on the data available in the respective country. They are 
derived from population censuses or from vital statistics. A combination of both sources 
can  also  be  applied,  and  at  times  these  sources  can  be  supplemented  by  informed 
professional  estimates.  Population  census-based  parity  distributions  utilize  data  on 
women of individual ages who have completed childbearing by number of children ever 
born.  Vital  statistics-based  parity  distributions  use  single-year,  age-specific  cohort 
fertility rates by single-year cohorts and by individual birth order to compute birth order 
total  cohort  fertility  rates.  In  the  analysis  four  family-size  categories  were  used: 
childless women, women with one child, women with two children, and women with 
three or more children. 
Data were not available for all European countries; therefore only three groups 
were used. Criteria for creating these were geographic and substantive. In very general 
terms, the countries in the respective groups experienced common socioeconomic and 
political developments during the 20
th century. The groups are: 
Northern and Western Europe: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, England & 
Wales, Netherlands, Austria and West Germany (included only in Panel A of Figure 1). 
Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (formerly  socialist  countries):  Czech  Republic, 




3. Family size trends  
3.1 Northern and Western Europe  
In the four family-size categories, several developments common to a number, often a 
majority, of countries stand out (Figure 1):  
In  the  long  run,  the  proportion  of  childless  women  experienced  an  extended 
decline that reached a  low plateau among the 1930s cohorts; a subsequent reversal 
occurred, and shares of childless women reached 15 to nearly 30 percent in the 1960s 
cohorts. 
Among the cohorts born early in the 20
th century, the shares of childless women 
were between 20 and 30 percent in the countries for which data were available (Figure 
1, Panel A). From thereon, a gradual decline took place involving at least 30 cohorts. 
Among the 1930s and early 1940s cohorts, the central cohorts that generated the “baby 
boom,” the proportions of childless women were clustered in a narrow range of 9 - 12 Frejka: Overview Chapter 2: Parity distribution and completed family size in Europe  
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percent. In subsequent cohorts, a renewed increase in childless women is taking place. 
Among cohorts completing their childbearing early in the 21
st century, i.e., the birth 
cohorts of the early 1960s, the share of childless women in several countries, such as 
Austria,  the  Netherlands,  England  &  Wales,  and  Sweden,  was  between  15  and  20 
percent. In contrast, shares of childless women in Denmark and France were low, close 
to 10 percent. 
In Western Germany, the precise proportion of childless women is not known, but 
there is no doubt that it was rising steeply among the 1960s cohorts (Figure 1, Panel A). 
Some authors estimated the childlessness share to be as high as 30 percent in the mid-
1960s cohorts (Germany chapter; Dorbritz, Ruckdeschel 2007). To a significant degree, 
childlessness  had  become  a  matter  of  deliberate  choice  (Höpflinger  1991).  Among 
young people in Western Germany, there are two main groups: “those who live with 
children and as a rule are also married, as opposed to those who have chosen not to 
have  children,  the  vast  majority  of  whom  do  not  marry”  (Germany  chapter).  Low 
fertility has become a matter of considerable concern to the German government, which 
has started to implement policy measures aimed at creating incentives and conditions 
that encourage childbearing (Auth 2006; Prskawetz et al. 2006). 
The  principal  reasons  for  the  relatively  high  levels  of  childlessness  among  the 
cohorts born around 1900, and among those of the 1960s, were very different. Quite 
large  proportions  of  women  born  in  the  late  19
th  and  early  20
th  centuries  remained 
single, and almost all of these did not have children. In part this was due to the large 
number of young men killed during the First World War (Germany chapter). Also, the 
unusually severe consequences of the Great Depression of the 1930s were reflected in 
generally  low  levels  of  fertility  and  high  rates  of  childlessness.  Relatively  frequent 
childlessness in recent decades is related to the complex changes that have taken place 
as young women spend more time acquiring advanced education as well as building up 
their  careers,  and  thus  having  to  cope  with  the  tensions  between  working  and 
childrearing. The above reasoning often applies equally to other countries, and these 
developments are discussed in greater detail in the country chapters and in overview 
chapters 4, 5, and 6.  
The two-child family became the norm following a steady long-term increase that 
reached  a  saturation  point  approximately  with  the  birth  cohorts  born  around  1950 
(Figure 1, Panel C).  
The proportion of women with two children was around 20 percent in the cohorts 
born early in the 20
th century; smaller than the shares of childless women, as well as the 
shares of one-child families and large families with three or more children (Figure 1, 
Panel C). The prevalence of the two-child family gradually grew from one generation to 
the next, and reached a peak among the cohorts of the late 1940s and early 1950s. As 
discussed in  most country chapters, the two-child family became the norm, both in   Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 4 
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reality and in the general perception of the public. In almost all populations of Northern 
and Western Europe, a  slight decline followed, and the shares of  women  with  two 
children were clustered to a remarkable extent around 40 percent in the 1960s birth 
cohorts. 
A less pronounced, and shorter-lived, increase in the shares of large families with 
three or more children occurred up to the prime baby boom cohorts of the 1930s; this 
was followed by a decline and stabilization (Figure 1, Panel D).  
A more detailed analysis of large families indicates that the decline in the shares of 
families with four and more children was much faster than the decline in families with 
three children (not shown here). In Austria, for instance, large families decreased by 75 
percent between the 1935 and the 1965 cohorts, and constituted about five percent of all 
families in the mid-1960s birth cohort. The share of the three-child family had declined 
by a mere 22 percent, with an almost stable 15 percent share of all families in the mid-
1960s cohorts (Austria chapter). 
Contrary to general perception, proportions of one-child families hardly changed 
over time, with quite a wide variation between countries (Figure 1, Panel B). 
For the time being, the one-child family is not a very common choice in most 
Northern  and  Western  European  countries.  In  the  Sweden  chapter  it  is  noted  that 
“having only one child is a rarely chosen family pattern.” 
 
 
3.2 Southern Europe  
The  time  series  for  Southern  European  populations  are  shorter  than  for  the  other 
countries, but commonalities in parity distribution trends can be detected nevertheless 
(Figure 2). 
Among  the  cohorts  of  the  late  1940s  and  1950s,  the  proportions  of  childless 
women were low, around 10 percent. These have been increasing among the cohorts of 
the 1960s (Figure 2, Panel A), although the absolute values of the percentages for the 
youngest  cohorts  in  the  available  time  series  are  probably  higher  than  in  reality
3 
(Sobotka 2004, chapter 5). But the trend of growth is the important aspect. The increase 
in childlessness has been the steepest in Italy, where, among the youngest cohorts, close 
to a fifth of all women apparently remain without children. 
Indisputably, shares of one-child families have been on the increase starting with 
the cohorts born in the 1940s (Figure 2, Panel B). In the 1960s birth cohorts, about one- 
                                                            
3 This is caused by imperfect estimation methods, which tend to underestimate the numbers of first births and 
thus overestimate women remaining childless among the youngest cohorts. Frejka: Overview Chapter 2: Parity distribution and completed family size in Europe  
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Figure 1:  Proportions of women, childless, or with one, two or three and  
    more children, selected Northern and Western European  













































































































   Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 4 
http://www.demographic-research.org  53 
Figure 1:  (continued)  
 
Panel C 









































































































Source: Country chapters and Observatoire Démographique Européen. Frejka: Overview Chapter 2: Parity distribution and completed family size in Europe  
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Figure 2:  Proportions of women, childless, or with one, two or three and more  
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Figure 2:  (continued)  
 
Panel C 


































































































Source: Country chapters and Observatoire Démographique Européen. Frejka: Overview Chapter 2: Parity distribution and completed family size in Europe  
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quarter of women in Italy and Spain had only one child. In Portugal, the proportion of 
one-child families was even higher; in Greece, lower. 
The  overwhelming  majorities  of  women  in  the  birth  cohorts  of  the  1940s  and 
1950s  had  two  children  (Figure  2,  Panel  C).  The  two-child  family  was  firmly 
established as the norm. An incipient decline in the percentages can be detected among 
the 1960s cohorts; in Italy, even among the cohorts of the late 1950s. The authors of the 
Italy  chapter  point  out  that,  in  the  1960  cohort,  women  with  two  children  are 
outnumbered by the sum of mothers of an only child and of childless women.  
The decline in the proportions of large families of three and more children was 
consistent  in  its  direction,  as  were  values  for  all  the  Southern  European  countries 
(Figure 2, Panel D). In Italy, the only country with a long time series, large families 
were  still the  norm among  the 1920s cohorts,  with almost a 40 percent share. The 
gradual decline started in the 1930s birth cohorts. Among the cohorts of the 1960s, less 
than 20 percent of women had large families. The trend direction indicates that this 
decline was still in progress among younger women. 
 
 
3.3 Central and Eastern Europe  
The countries for which data are available undoubtedly display common trends, yet at 
the same time there is a notably greater heterogeneity than in the other two regions 
(Figure 3). 
Shares of childless women were apparently quite high in most of these countries 
among the cohorts born early in the 20
th century (Figure 3, Panel A). These gradually 
declined to a level of around 10 percent and less. The low levels of childlessness were 
typical among the cohorts of the 1930s, and even more so among the 1940s and 1950s 
cohorts, essentially during the period of stable authoritarian rule. The childless shares 
started to increase among the cohorts of the 1960s. The rise in the shares of childless 
women is a recent phenomenon. The analyses in practically all the country chapters 
indicate that this growth is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. 
While shares of the one-child family underwent some fluctuations in the majority 
of Central and Eastern European countries, levels in these countries  were relatively 
stable  except  among    the  youngest  birth  cohorts  (Figure  3,  Panel  B).  The  Russian 
population did not comply with this pattern of long-term stability. The revolutionary 
changes of the political system and the subsequent unsettled conditions during the first 
half of the 20
th century are reflected in the changes of the parity distribution in Russia 
(Figure 3 and Russia chapter). In the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries, the proportion of 
Russian families with one child was low; its share was only eight percent among the 
generations born around 1900. But the share of one-child families in Russia increased   Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 4 
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rapidly thereafter, reaching three times that level among the 1920s cohorts. Starting 
with the cohorts of the mid-1930s, the proportion of one-child families has been notably 
higher in Russia than in any of the other countries. A considerable increase in one-child 
families  occurred  in  the  youngest  cohorts,  those  born  in  the  late  1950s  and  1960s. 
Similar rates of growth of one-child families took place in all these countries among the 
youngest generations, but at lower levels (Figure 3, Panel B). 
The  two-child  family  experienced  steady  growth  almost  throughout  the  entire 
period of  observation.  The  proportions  were  apparently  between  10  and  30 percent 
among  the  cohorts  born  early  in  the  20
th  century,  and  increased  to  about  40  to  60 
percent among the 1950s birth cohorts (Figure 3, Panel C). In most countries, the peak 
share was reached with the cohorts born around 1960. Among the cohorts of the 1960s, 
this  proportion  stabilized  or  experienced  an  incipient  minor  decline.  The  two-child 
family was firmly established as the norm. On average, it was as prevalent as the other 
three groups combined. In the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Bulgaria, the share of the 
two-child family was unusually high among the cohorts of the 1950s and early 1960s, 
55 percent and higher. 
In most countries of this region, shares of women with three or more children were 
slowly  and  steadily  declining  throughout  almost  the  whole  period  of  observation 
(Figure 3, Panel D). There were a few exceptions. In Bulgaria, a lower proportion of 
large families was already observable among cohorts of the 1930s. On the other hand, 
in  Romania  shares  of  large  families  increased,  and  were  relatively  high  among  the 
cohorts of the 1930s and 1940s as a result of the forceful pro-natalist policies of the 
Ceau escu  regime.  In  Poland,  the  relatively  high  proportion  of  women  with  large 
families remained unchanged for the cohorts of the late 1940s and the 1950s. In many 




3.4 The entire continent and the overall picture  
Based on the above exploration, answers to two crucial questions can be outlined: 
 
What were the principal trends characterizing family size during the 20
th century?  
Which changes in family size were important in shaping fertility trends? 
 
In  the  interest  of  averting  any  confusion  that  might  otherwise  arise,  a  reminder  is 
warranted: namely, that this analysis and its findings deal with developments up to and 
including  the  late  1980s  only.  Completed  cohort  fertility  data  were  used  for  this  
 Frejka: Overview Chapter 2: Parity distribution and completed family size in Europe  
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Figure 3:  Proportions of women, childless, with one, two or three and more  
  children, selected Central and Eastern European countries, birth  
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Figure 3:  (Continued) 
 
Panel C 















































































































Source: Country chapters and Observatoire Démographique Européen. Frejka: Overview Chapter 2: Parity distribution and completed family size in Europe  
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analysis, which precludes the possibility of learning about changes in family size during 
the most recent 10 to 15 years. It should also be noted that, while not all European 
countries were part of the analysis thus far, a sufficiently large number were included 
that these countries can be considered representative of the entire continent. 
The most prominent feature in the development of parity distributions during the 
second half of the 20
th century was the gradual ascension of the two-child family model, 
which  established  its  undisputed  reign  notably  among  the  cohorts  of  the  1950s.  In 
virtually every country, the share of women with two children reached the 40 percent 
mark (Panels C, Figures 1, 2 and 3). In some populations, women with two children 
comprised the absolute majority of all families, i.e., over 50 percent constituted two-
child families.  
Among  the  1950s,  and  more  so  among  the  1960s,  birth  cohorts,  signs  of  an 
incipient erosion of the two-child family model can be detected. In over half of the 
Central and Eastern European countries, and in the Southern European countries, there 
was a decline in the proportion of two-child families among these cohorts. We will 
return to this development below.  
The decline in the shares of large families was another prevailing trend (panels D, 
Figures 1, 2 and 3). Detailed analyses show that it was mainly the proportions of really 
large families of four and more children that were declining (Country chapters; Frejka, 
Sardon  2004  and  2007).  The  shares  of  three-child  families  were  decreasing  at  a 
moderate pace, and their proportions were stabilizing in some countries. There were 
also differing regional variants of the large family trends. In the Northern and Western 
European countries, there was an increase of large families in the middle of the 20
th 
century, culminating among the baby boom cohorts born in the 1920s and 1930s. A 
rapid decline in large families followed, which ended among the 1950s cohorts. In the 
Southern, Central and Eastern European countries, the decline of large families was 
moderate and continuous. 
An increase in childlessness among recent generations was an almost universal 
trend. The timing of this trend differs between countries and regions. In Northern and 
Western  Europe,  this  increase  started  with  the  birth  cohorts  of  the  late  1940s;  in 
Southern  Europe,  among  the  1950s  cohorts;  and  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  it 
started with the 1960s cohorts. There were a number of exceptions to this trend. The 
proportions of childless women in France did not grow, and childlessness fluctuated in 
Denmark. The increases in childlessness were moderate among the 1960s cohorts in 
some of the Central and Eastern European countries, such as the Czech and Slovak 
Republics. The socioeconomic analyses in the country chapters support the notion that 
increases in childlessness are likely to continue. In a comprehensive investigation of 
childlessness in cohorts that have already entered the reproductive ages, Sobotka (2005) 
arrived  at  the  conclusion  “that  childlessness  will  increase  gradually  in  almost  all   Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 4 
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industrialized countries, although the timing and the magnitude of this change varies 
across countries. …  In the high-childlessness regions--especially West Germany and 
England & Wales--final childlessness among women born after 1970 is likely to come 
close to 25 percent and will almost certainly remain under 30 percent, while the more 
common levels will range between 15 and 22 percent.” 
The prevalence of the one-child family was relatively large and growing in Central 
and Eastern European countries, as well as in Southern Europe. In most Northern and 
Western European countries, trends in the shares of the one-child family were flat and 
relatively low.  
As indicated above, there were incipient signs of erosion of the two-child family 
norm. This could be observed mainly in the Central and Eastern European countries, 
whereas the two-child family norm appeared to hold steady in Northern and Western 
Europe. Among the birth cohorts of the late 1950s and the 1960s, the proportions of 
childless women, as well as those of women with one child, experienced considerable 
relative increases (Table 1). The increments were at the expense of large and of two-
child families. In some countries, the proportions of childless women were increasing 
faster than the shares of one-child families, especially  in countries  where two-child 
families were losing ground, such as Slovenia, Poland and Bulgaria. While the relative 
increase of childless women was considerable, the growth in the proportions of one-
child families was also important.  
 
Table 1:  Changes in proportions of family size between 1955 and 1965 birth  
  cohorts, Central and Eastern European countries  
 
Percent change in proportion of family size  
between 1955 and 1965 birth cohorts (1955=100) 
Country 
Three and more 
children  Two child  One child  Childless 
Czech Republic  82  100  121  120 
Slovak Republic   76  103  145  114 
Slovenia  83  91  118  160 
Poland  89  93  104  159 
Lithuania  74  94  124  111 
Bulgaria   72  91  127  194 
Romania  70  97  130  131 
Russian Federation  59  90  140  127 
 
Source: Country chapters and Observatoire Démographique Européen. 
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3.5 Cohorts completing childbearing early in the 21
st century  
The average family size of the cohorts completing their childbearing around the year 
2000  is,  at  best,  at  the  replacement  level:  it  ranges  from  1.50  to  2.05,  or,  in  lay 
language, from one and a half to two children (Table 2).  
It cannot be stressed enough that a great deal of variety in the parity composition 
prevails as the principal feature.  
In comparing the three regions, some might consider it counterintuitive that the 
smallest shares of large families were in Southern European (SE) countries, while the 
largest shares of these families were in Northern and Western Europe (NWE). The two-
child family dominates throughout the continent, but especially in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE). The largest shares of the one-child family can also be found in CEE 
countries; the smallest, in NWE. The smallest proportions of childless women tend to 
be in CEE and the largest in NWE. 
When  looking  at  individual  countries,  various  extremes  emerge.  The  Russian 
Federation had the largest share of one-child families, combined with small proportions 
of childless women and a small share of large families. The country with the largest 
share of two-child families was Bulgaria, which also had numerous one-child families, 
but  few  large  families  and  childless  women.  Norway,  Sweden  and  France  had  the 
largest shares of families of more than three children. The largest shares of childless 
women were in Italy, followed by England & Wales, the Netherlands and Austria
4.   
 
                                                            
4 The proportion of childless women was estimated to have been even larger in West Germany, but data were 
not available for the whole parity distribution (see Figure 1, Panel A).   Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 4 
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Table 2:  Parity distribution in percent, selected European countries, 1965 or  
  latest available birth cohort  
 
Parity (in percent) 
Country, Region  Cohort  0  1  2  3+ 
Total cohort 
fertility rate 
    Northern & Western Europe 
Denmark  1965  12.7  17.9  44.3  25.1  1.93 
Norway  1953  10.4  14.6  44.1  30.9  2.05 
Sweden  1960  15.1  13.4  41.5  30.0  2.04 
France  1965  10.3  18.4  41.2  30.2  2.03 
England & Wales  1960  18.9  12.0  39.3  29.8  1.89 
Netherlands  1965  18.2  16.9  42.0  22.9  1.78 
Austria  1965  17.2  23.7  38.6  20.5  1.65 
    Southern Europe 
Greece  1963  14.9  16.8  48.9  19.4  1.79 
Italy  1965  24.0  23.5  36.9  15.6  1.51 
Spain  1963  11.8  27.3  47.1  13.8  1.67 
Portugal  1963  5.1  31.9  45.5  17.5  1.84 
    Central & Eastern Europe 
Czech Republic  1965  7.5  18.7  54.4  19.4  1.93 
Slovak Republic  1965  11.4  16.4  45.5  26.7  2.04 
Slovenia  1965  10.5  25.3  50.1  13.9  1.77 
Poland  1965  15.5  17.7  37.5  29.3  2.00 
Lithuania  1965  9.5  28.3  47.3  14.9  1.73 
Bulgaria  1965  9.4  24.6  55.4  10.6  1.83 
Romania  1965  13.1  28.6  38.2  20.1  1.91 
Russian Federation  1965  8.5  37.0  43.8  10.7  1.65 
 
 
4. Parity progression ratios (PPRs)  
Statistics on the propensity to progress from one parity to the next provide an additional 
perspective,  namely,  these  illuminate  various  paths  of  family  formation.  Parity 
progression ratios portray changes in patterns of family formation that occurred during 
the 20
th century, and enable the comparison between countries during this period. As 
only a smaller number of countries with such data were available, just two groups were 
formed for this analysis. The Northern, Western and Southern European countries are in 
one group (Figure 4), and the available Central and Eastern European countries are in a 
second  group  (Figure  5).  The  relatively  small  number  of  countries  implies  that 
generalizations have their limitations. Nevertheless, the following analyses provide a 
reasonably adequate idea of what has transpired.   
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4.1 Northern, Western and Southern Europe (in short, the “West”)  
The propensity to have a first child moved along similar paths in all these populations 
among the cohorts of the 1930s and early 1940s (Figure 4, Panel A). This trend even 
increased somewhat,  with close to 90 percent of  women in the baby boom cohorts 
having a first birth. Beginning with the cohorts of the mid 1940s, the PPRs 0→1 began 
to  decline  in  a  number  of  countries,  and  remained  stable  in  others.  In  France  the 
propensity to have a first child remained at the 90 percent level through the cohorts of 
the 1960s, with Denmark not far behind. A moderate yet steady decline in the PPRs 
0→1 started among the cohorts of the late 1940s in the Netherlands, England & Wales, 
and Austria. In the cohorts of the early 1960s, the propensity to have a first child was 
between 80 and 82 percent in the latter three countries. In Italy the decline of the PPR 
0→1 started with the cohorts of the mid 1950s, and was steep so that, among  the 1960s 
cohorts, only 75 to 80 percent of women had a first birth. 
There was a considerable variety in the PPRs 1→2 in the West (Figure 4, Panel B). 
England & Wales, Sweden, the Netherlands, France and Greece had ratios at or above 
0.80. In contrast, Austria and especially Italy experienced declines in the PPRs 1→2, 
and among the cohorts of the 1960s only about 70 percent of women with one child 
went on to have a second birth. 
The  retreat  from  the  baby  boom  is  especially  visible  in  the  declines  of  the 
progression ratios from second to third births, and even more so in a prolonged decline 
of the PPRs 3→4 (Figure 4, Panels C and D). The declines of the PPRs 2→3 occurred 
in most countries among the cohorts of the late 1930s and the early 1940s. Among the 
cohorts of the 1950s and 1960s, these ratios settled at levels over 0.35; in Italy and 
Austria, the decline continued even among the cohorts of the 1950s, with only around 
30 to 35 percent of women with two children going on to have a third birth. 
What is important for the overall level of fertility in individual countries is the 
combined result of trends and levels of all parity progression ratios. In contemporary 
low-fertility populations, it is mainly the progression to first, second and third births. To 
illustrate this point, two cases will be compared. Italy experienced a rapid decline of 
PPRs 0→1 with levels below 0.80 in the 1960s cohorts. The pathway for the PPRs 
1→2, as well as the PPRs 2→3, was also one of decline and eventual low levels (Figure 
4, Panels A, B and C). In contrast, the French population had high and steady PPRs 
0→1 at the 0.90 level; it did not experience any decline of the fairly high PPRs 1→2; 
and although there was an initial decline in the progression to third births, these PPRs 
settled  at  the  highest  level  for  all  countries  among  the  youngest  cohorts  (Figure  4, 
Panels A, B and C). Consequently, the total cohort fertility rates among the mid 1960s 
cohorts were about 1.5 in Italy, and 2.0 in France (Council of Europe 2006). 
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4.2 Central and Eastern Europe (in short, the “East”)  
The progression ratios to first births were consistently high during the socialist era in all 
the Central and Eastern European countries, between 0.90 and 0.95 (Figure 5, Panel A). 
Signs of declines show up among the cohorts of the 1960s, most notably in Poland. 
The levels of the PPRs 1→2 differed greatly between countries, but the trends 
were not too varied (Figure 5, Panel B). By far the lowest level of PPRs 1→2 was in the 
Russian  Federation.  Interestingly,  progression  to  second  births  increased  up  to  the 
1950s  cohorts  in  the  Czech  Republic,  and  some  increase  could  also  be  detected  in 
Poland. A common feature for all these populations was a notable subsequent decline in 
the PPRs 1→2, which usually started with the cohorts born around 1960. In the Russian 
Federation, this decline was the fastest. 
The  progression  ratios  to  third  births  were  declining  among  most  cohorts  in 
question (Figure 5, Panel C). The levels were distinctly higher in Poland and the Slovak 
Republic, which were the countries with higher fertility at that time. 
A gradual decline occurred in the PPRs 3→4 up to the 1950s cohorts (Figure 5, 
Panel D), after which the percentage of women with three children who continued on to 
have a fourth child consolidated at between 20 and 40 percent. This may seem high, but 
it is actually of minor consequence because the intensity of third birth fertility rates was 
already extremely low in these countries (Frejka, Sardon 2007). 
Overall, the trends of changes in the parity progression ratios in the East were in 
analogous directions. There was a considerable spread in the variety of levels between 
countries, except for the PPRs 0→1. The persistently lowest PPRs 1→2 in the Russian 
Federation constituted a serious deviation consistent with the prominence of the one-
child family in that country since the 1940 cohorts (Figure 3, Panel B). The common 
decline  in  the  PPRs  1→2  among  the  cohorts  of  the  late  1950s  and  early  1960s 
constitutes an important element among the indications  suggesting a possible start of 
an erosion of the two-child family model.   
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Figure 4:  Parity progression ratios, Northern, Western and Southern Europe,  
  birth cohorts 1930-1966  
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Figure 4:  (Continued)  
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Source: Country chapters and Observatoire Démographique Européen. 
Note: Data for Denmark, Netherlands, England & Wales, Italy and Greece not available. Frejka: Overview Chapter 2: Parity distribution and completed family size in Europe  
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Figure 5:  Parity progression ratios, Central and Eastern Europe, birth cohorts  
  1930-1966 
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Figure 5:  (Continued)  
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Source: Country chapters and Observatoire Démographique Européen. 
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5. Conclusions  
The two-child family was well established in almost all European countries towards the 
end of the 20
th century. But how long is this dominance of the two-child family going to 
last? Shares of childless women were growing among cohorts of the 1950s and 1960s, 
yet  it  is  too  early  to  tell  when,  and  at  what  level,  these  shares  might  stabilize. 
Proportions of one-child families were stable in Northern and Western Europe, and 
were increasing in Southern Europe and the Central and Eastern European countries. So 
far it appears that proportions of childless women are growing faster than shares of 
women with one child. In some countries, however, shares of the one-child family were 
growing rapidly, and their proportions were becoming close to equal to those of the 
two-child  family,  notably  in  Romania  and  the  Russian  Federation.  Shares  of  large 
families were continuing to decline in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, and were 
quite  stable  in  Western  and  Northern  Europe.  The  overall  analyses  in  the  country 
chapters and in other overview chapters indicate that a comeback of the large family is 
not a realistic prospect. 
There were some incipient signs that the two-child family might be starting to lose 
its prominent position. Will it be replaced mostly by childless women, or by the one-
child family? Neither of these alternatives appears likely in the near future. But in a few 
countries, shares of the small family (defined as a combination of childless and one-
child families) were close to matching the two-child family shares among the early to 
mid-1960s cohorts.  Considering that  fertility continued to decline in  most countries 
during the 1990s and early 2000s (cf. overview chapter 1), and keeping in mind that 
shares of large families are not likely to increase, it is only reasonable to conclude that 
the  weight of  “small  families” is increasing at the expense of the two-child family 
among the cohorts of the 1970s, and possibly also among the cohorts of the early 1980s. 
We will know for sure when these cohorts approach the end of their childbearing years. 
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